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Gilbert et al. conclude that evidence from the Open Science Collaboration’s Reproducibility
Project: Psychology indicates high reproducibility, given the study methodology. Their
very optimistic assessment is limited by statistical misconceptions and by causal
inferences from selectively interpreted, correlational data. Using the Reproducibility
Project: Psychology data, both optimistic and pessimistic conclusions about
reproducibility are possible, and neither are yet warranted.
A
cross multiple indicators of reproducibil-
ity, the Open Science Collaboration (1)
(OSC2015) observed that the original result
was replicated in ~40 of 100 studies sam-
pled from three journals. Gilbert et al. (2)
conclude that the reproducibility rate is, in fact,
as high as could be expected, given the study
methodology. We agree with them that both
methodological differences between original
and replication studies and statistical power
affect reproducibility, but their very optimistic
assessment is based on statistical misconceptions
and selective interpretation of correlational data.
Gilbert et al. focused on a variation of one of
OSC2015’s five measures of reproducibility: how
often the confidence interval (CI) of the original
study contains the effect size estimate of the rep-
lication study. They misstated that the expected
replication rate assuming only sampling error is
95%, which is true only if both studies estimate the
same population effect size and the replication has
infinite sample size (3,4). OSC2015 replications did
not have infinite sample size. In fact, the expected
replication rate was 78.5% using OSC2015’s CI
measure (see OSC2015’s supplementary informa-
tion, pp. 56 and 76; https://osf.io/k9rnd). By this
measure, the actual replication rate was only
47.4%, suggesting the influence of factors other
than sampling error alone.
Within another large replication study, “Many
Labs” (5) (ML2014), Gilbert et al. found that
65.5% ofML2014 studies would bewithin the CIs
of other ML2014 studies of the same phenome-
non and concluded that this reflects the max-
imum reproducibility rate for OSC2015. Their
analysis using ML2014 is misleading and does
not apply to estimating reproducibility with
OSC2015’s data for a number of reasons.
First, Gilbert et al.’s estimates are based on
pairwise comparisons between all of the repli-
cations within ML2014. As such, for roughly half
of their failures to replicate, “replications” had
larger effect sizes than “original studies,” whereas
just 5% of OSC2015 replications had replication
CIs exceeding the original study effect sizes.
Second, Gilbert et al. apply the by-site varia-
bility in ML2014 to OSC2015’s findings, thereby
arriving at higher estimates of reproducibility.
However, ML2014’s primary finding was that
by-site variability was highest for the largest
(replicable) effects and lowest for the smallest
(nonreplicable) effects. If ML2014’s primary find-
ing is generalizable, then Gilbert et al.’s analysis
may leverage by-site variability in ML2014’s larger
effects to exaggerate the effect of by-site variabil-
ity on OSC2015’s nonreproduced smaller effects,
thus overestimating reproducibility.
Third, Gilbert et al. use ML2014’s 85% repli-
cation rate (after aggregating across all 6344 par-
ticipants) to argue that reproducibility is high
when extremely high power is used. This inter-
pretation is based on ML2014’s small, ad hoc
sample of classic and new findings, as opposed to
OSC2015’s effort to examine a more representa-
tive sample of studies in high-impact journals.
Had Gilbert et al. selected the similar Many Labs
3 study (6) instead of ML2014, they would have
arrived at a more pessimistic conclusion: a 30%
overall replication success rate with a multisite,
very high-powered design.
That said, Gilbert et al.’s analysis demonstrates
that differences between laboratories and sam-
ple populations reduce reproducibility according
to the CI measure. Also, some true effects may
exist even among nonsignificant replications (our
additional analysis finding evidence for these
effects is available at https://osf.io/smjge). True
effects can fail to be detected because power cal-
culations for replication studies are based on
effect sizes in original studies. As OSC2015 dem-
onstrates, original study effect sizes are likely
inflated due to publication bias. Unfortunately,
Gilbert et al.’s focus on the CI measure of re-
producibility neither addresses nor can account
for the facts that the OSC2015 replication effect
sizes were about half the size of the original
studies on average, and 83% of replications elic-
ited smaller effect sizes than the original studies.
The combined results of OSC2015’s five indica-
tors of reproducibility suggest that, even if true,
most effects are likely to be smaller than the
original results suggest.
Gilbert et al. attribute some of the failures to
replicate to “low-fidelity protocols” with meth-
odological differences relative to the original, for
which they provide six examples. In fact, the
original authors recommended or endorsed three
of the six methodological differences discussed
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by Gilbert et al., and a fourth (the racial bias study
from America replicated in Italy) was replicated
successfully. Gilbert et al. also supposed that non-
endorsement of protocols by the original authors
was evidence of critical methodological differ-
ences. Then they showed that replications that
were endorsed by the original authorsweremore
likely to be replicated than those not endorsed
(nonendorsed studies included 18 original au-
thors not responding and 11 voicing concerns).
In fact, OSC2015 tested whether rated similarity
of the replication and original study was corre-
latedwith replication success and observedweak
relationships across reproducibility indicators
(e.g., r = 0.015 with P < 0.05 criterion; supplemen-
tary information, p. 67; https://osf.io/k9rnd).
Further, there is an alternative explanation for
the correlation between endorsement and repli-
cation success; authors who were less confident
of their study’s robustness may have been less
likely to endorse the replications. Consistent with
the alternative account, prediction markets ad-
ministered on OSC2015 studies showed that it is
possible to predict replication failure in advance
based on a brief description of the original find-
ing (7). Finally, Gilbert et al. ignored correlational
evidence in OSC2015 countering their interpreta-
tion, such as evidence that surprising or more
underpowered research designs (e.g., interaction
tests) were less likely to be replicated. In sum,
Gilbert et al. made a causal interpretation for
OSC2015’s reproducibility with selective inter-
pretation of correlational data. A constructive step
forward would be revising the previously non-
endorsed protocols to see if they can achieve en-
dorsement and then conducting replications with
the updated protocols to see if reproducibility
rates improve.
More generally, there is no such thing as exact
replication (8–10). All replications differ in innu-
merable ways from original studies. They are con-
ducted in different facilities, in different weather,
with different experimenters, with different com-
puters and displays, in different languages, at dif-
ferent points in history, and so on. What counts
as a replication involves theoretical assessments
of the many differences expected to moderate a
phenomenon. OSC2015 defined (direct) replica-
tion as “the attempt to recreate the conditions
believed sufficient for obtaining a previously ob-
served finding.” When results differ, it offers an
opportunity for hypothesis generation and then
testing to determine why. When results do not
differ, it offers some evidence that the finding is
generalizable. OSC2015 provides initial, not defin-
itive, evidence—just like the original studies it
replicated.
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